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Abstract
We investigate the definition of security for encryption scheme in quantum
context. We systematically define the indistinguishability and semantic se-
curity for quantum public-key and private-key encryption schemes, and for
computational security, physical security and information-theoretic security.
Based on our definition, we present a necessary and sufficient condition that
leads to information-theoretic indistinguishability for quantum encryption
scheme. The equivalence between the indistinguishability and semantic se-
curity of quantum encryption scheme is also proved.
Keywords: indistinguishability, semantic security, quantum encryption
scheme
1. Introduction
The definition of security for encryption scheme is an important area of
cryptography. Up till now, both the quantum public-key encryption [1, 2, 3,
4, 5] and quantum private-key encryption [6, 7, 8] has been carried out. Here
we investigate the indistinguishability and semantic security into quantum
context which would be useful for analysis the security of quantum encryption
schemes.
In our previous work, we have already shown the definition of the in-
distinguishability for quantum public-key encryption scheme[9], for quan-
tum private-key encryption scheme[10],and for quantum bit commitment
scheme and have presented a necessary and sufficient condition leads to
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this security[11]. Here we will systematically define the indistinguishabil-
ity and semantic security for quantum public-key and private-key encryption
schemes, and for computational security, physical security and information-
theoretic security.
The quantum parameters are continuous variable. In order to give the def-
inition of indistinguishability for quantum encryption scheme, we first give a
definition of indistinguishability for encryption scheme with continuous vari-
able based on probability density function, and a definition of indistinguisha-
bility based on multi-circuits. We show that these definitions are equivalent.
Then we prove that the indistinguishability based on multi-circuits is equiv-
alent to ordinary indistinguishability with single-circuit. Then we get the
definition of indistinguishability for quantum encryption scheme. Similarly
we define the semantic security.
The equivalence between computational indistinguishability and semantic
security for classical encryption scheme is already proved, but the equivalence
for information-theoretic ones is still an open problem. For public-key encryp-
tion scheme, there is no information-theoretically secure classical public-key
encryption scheme, so we discuss the equivalence between computational in-
distinguishability and semantic security for quantum encryption scheme and
between information-theoretic ones. About private-key encryption scheme,
the equivalence between computational indistinguishability and semantic se-
curity for quantum encryption scheme and between information-theoretic
ones for classical and quantum encryption schemes all are discussed.
2. Preliminaries
The definitions of indistinguishability and semantic security were firstly
presented by S. Goldwasser and S. Milcali[12, 13], then Goldrich[14] devel-
oped these definitions and classify defined the indistinguishability and se-
mantic security with different conditions.
2.1. Indistinguishability
The indistinguishability for private-key encryption scheme is:
Definition 1. (indistinguishability for private-key encryption scheme): A
private-key encryption scheme, (G,E,D), is said to be an indistinguishable
scheme if for every polynomial-size circuit family {Cn}, every positive poly-
nomial p(·), all sufficiently large n, and every x, y ∈ {0, 1}Poly(n),
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|Pr[Cn(EG1(1n)(x)) = 1]− Pr[Cn(EG1(1n)(y)) = 1]| <
1
p(n)
. (1)
For public-key encryption scheme, the indistinguishability is defined as:
Definition 2. (indistinguishability for public-key encryption scheme): A
public-key encryption scheme, (G,E,D), is said to be an indistinguishable
scheme if for every polynomial-size circuit family {Cn}, every positive poly-
nomial p(·), all sufficiently large n, and every x, y ∈ {0, 1}Poly(n),
|Pr[Cn(G1(1
n), EG1(1n)(x)) = 1]− Pr[Cn(G1(1
n), EG1(1n)(y)) = 1]| <
1
p(n)
. (2)
These definitions are based on computational security, if the inequalities
are satisfied for every circuit family {Cn} instead of for every polynomial-size
circuit family {Cn}, we gains the definitions based on information-theoretic
security.
2.2. Semantic security
The semantic security for private-key encryption scheme is shown as:
Definition 3. (semantic security for private-key encryption scheme):
A private-key encryption scheme, (G,E,D), is said to be semantically
secure if for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A there exists a
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A′ such that for every probability en-
semble {Xn}n∈N, with |Xn| ≤ poly(n), every pair of polynomially bounded
functions f(·), h(·): {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗, every positive polynomial p(·) and all
sufficiently large n,
Pr[A(1n, EG1(1n)(Xn), 1
|Xn|, h(1n, Xn)) = f(1
n, Xn)]
< Pr[A′(1n, 1|Xn|, h(1n, Xn)) = f(1
n, Xn) +
1
p(n)
. (3)
For public-key encryption scheme, it is:
Definition 4. (indistinguishability for public-key encryption scheme):
A public-key encryption scheme, (G,E,D), is said to be semantically se-
cure if for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A there exists a prob-
abilistic polynomial-time algorithm A′ such that for every {Xn}n∈N,f(·), h(·)p(·)
and n as in Definition 3,
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Pr[A(1n, G1(1
n), EG1(1n)(Xn), 1
|Xn|, h(1n, Xn)) = f(1
n, Xn)]
< Pr[A′(1n, 1|Xn|, h(1n, Xn))
= f(1n, Xn) +
1
p(n)
. (4)
Similarly, These definitions are based on computational security, if the
inequalities are satisfied that for every algorithm A there exists a probabilistic
algorithm A′ instead of for every polynomial-time algorithm A there exists
a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A′, we gains the definitions based
on information-theoretic security.
3. Indistinguishability for quantum encryption scheme
Firstly, we discuss the indistinguishability of quantum private-key en-
cryption scheme based on that of classical private-key encryption scheme.
3.1. Indistinguishability based on probability density function
As the quantum information is continuous character, if we want to de-
fine the indistinguishability of quantum encryption scheme, firstly we should
present the indistinguishability of continuous variable. It must depend on the
probability density function, so we give the C-indistinguishability of classical
information as follow:
Definition 5. If the plaintext is continuous variable, let the probability den-
sity function of plaintext space P is q(x), which is a continuous function. A
private-key encryption scheme, (G,E,D), is said to be a C-indistinguishable
scheme if it satisfies the condition as follow: for every polynomial-size cir-
cuit families {Cn}, every positive polynomial p(·), all sufficiently large n, and
every x, y ∈ P ,
∣∣Pr[Cn(EG1(1n)(x)) = 1]− Pr[Cn(EG1(1n)(y)) = 1]
∣∣ < 1
p(n)
. (5)
3.2. Indistinguishability based on multi-circuits
Then we show a definition of indistinguishability based on multi-circuits
as follow:
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Definition 6. A private-key encryption scheme, (G,E,D), is said to be a
M-indistinguishable scheme if for every polynomial-size circuit families {C in},
here i = 1, 2 · · · , m, every positive polynomial pi(·), all sufficiently large n,
and every xi, yi ∈ {0, 1}
Poly(n),
|Pr[C1n(EG1(1n)(x1)) = 1] − Pr[C
1
n(EG1(1n)(y1)) = 1]| <
1
p1(n)
,
|Pr[C2n(EG1(1n)(x2)) = 1] − Pr[C
2
n(EG1(1n)(y2)) = 1]| <
1
p2(n)
,
...
|Pr[Cmn (EG1(1n)(xm)) = 1] − Pr[C
m
n (EG1(1n)(ym)) = 1]| <
1
pm(n)
. (6)
3.3. Equivalence of the definitions
Based on above definitions of indistinguishability, we will prove that they
are all equivalence. The proofs in this section are all based on definitions of
computational security.
Lemma 1. If a private-key encryption scheme is said to be a M-indistinguishable
scheme if and only if it is an indistinguishable scheme.
Proof. For both sufficiency and necessity, we can prove with reduction
to absurdity. Here we prove the sufficiency for example:
If the scheme is not M-indistinguishable, there must exist at least a
polynomial-size circuit family {C in}, a positive polynomial pi(·), and xi, yi ∈
{0, 1}Poly(n), which lead to that for all sufficiently large n
|Pr[C in(EG1(1n)(xi)) = 1]− Pr[C
i
n(EG1(1n)(yi)) = 1]| ≥
1
pi(n)
. (7)
Therefore, if we let {Cn} = {C
i
n}, p(·) = pi(·), x = xi, y = yi, we can get:
|Pr[Cn(EG1(1n)(x)) = 1]− Pr[Cn(EG1(1n)(y)) = 1]| ≥
1
p(n)
, (8)
for all sufficiently large n, which means this scheme is not indistinguishable.
Thus the sufficiency is proved.
Similarly, we can use prove the necessity. 
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Lemma 2. If a private-key encryption scheme with continuous plaintext is
said to be a C-indistinguishable scheme if it is a indistinguishable scheme.
Proof. Assume the scheme is not a C-indistinguishable scheme, there
must exist x, y ∈ P , which satisfy that for all sufficiently large n, every
polynomial-size circuit families {Cn}, every positive polynomial p(·):
∣∣Pr[Cn(EG1(1n)(x)) = 1]− Pr[Cn(EG1(1n)(y)) = 1]
∣∣ ≥ 1
p(n)
. (9)
Let n0 = max{|x|, |y|}, here |x| is the length of x, and let n > n0, we can get
that: there exist x, y ∈ {0, 1}Poly(n), which satisfy that for all sufficiently large
n, every polynomial-size circuit families {Cn}, every positive polynomial p(·):
∣∣Pr[Cn(EG1(1n)(x)) = 1]− Pr[Cn(EG1(1n)(y)) = 1]
∣∣ ≥ 1
p(n)
. (10)
This reaches a contradiction to the hypothesis that the scheme is a indis-
tinguishable scheme. Thus the lemma follows. 
The equivalence of these definitions is almost proved except the necessity
of lemma.2, we planed to complete this side via the definition based on multi-
circuits, but it has not worked out yet, so it is still a conjecture.
Conjecture 1. If a private-key encryption scheme with continuous plain-
text is said to be a C-indistinguishable scheme if and only if it is a M-
indistinguishable scheme.
3.4. Indistinguishability for quantum encryption scheme
As the indistinguishability of classical private-key encryption scheme can
lead to that of continuous variable, We suggest here a definition of information-
theoretic indistinguishability for quantum private-key encryption scheme as
follow:
Definition 7. A quantum private-key encryption scheme is information-
theoretically indistinguishable if for every quantum circuit family {Cn}, every
positive polynomial p(·), all sufficiently large n’s, and every x, y ∈ {0, 1}:
∣∣∣Pr[Cn(EG(1n)(x)) = 1]− Pr[Cn(EG(1n)(y)) = 1]
∣∣∣ <
1
p(n)
, (11)
where the encryption algorithm E should be a quantum algorithm, and the
ciphertext E(x), E(y) are quantum states.
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Similarly, for quantum public-key encryption scheme, the information-
theoretic indistinguishability is shown as:
Definition 8. A quantum public-key encryption scheme is information-
theoretically indistinguishable if for every quantum circuit family {Cn}, every
positive polynomial p(·), all sufficiently large n’s, and every x, y in plaintext
space:
∣∣∣Pr[Cn(G(1n), EG(1n)(x) = 1]− Pr[Cn(G(1n), EG(1n)(y) = 1]
∣∣∣ <
1
p(n)
, (12)
where the encryption algorithm E should be a quantum algorithm, and the
ciphertext E(x), E(y) are quantum states.
In classical context, the security is defined under two conditions, here the
quantum definitions can be classified by three different conditions:
1. As defined above, we get the definitions of information-theoretic indis-
tinguishability.
2. If the inequalities are satisfied for polynomial-size quantum circuit fam-
ily {Cn} instead of for every circuit family {Cn}, it results the defini-
tions of computational indistinguishability.
3. If the inequalities are satisfied for specifical exponential-size quantum
circuit family {Cn} it results the definitions of physical indistinguisha-
bility, here the size is determined by the protocol.
The physical security we presented here means that even it may be not
information-theoretical secure, the way to attack is unable to realize limited
to the objective physical conditions.
3.5. The necessary and sufficient condition for information-theoretic indis-
tinguishability
Here we present the sufficient and necessary condition of the information-
theoretic indistinguishability for quantum private-key encryption scheme as
follow:
Theorem 1. For every plaintexts x and y and key k, let the density oper-
ators of cipher states
∑
k pkEk(x) and
∑
k pkEk(y) are ρx and ρy, respec-
tively. A quantum private-key encryption scheme is said to be information-
theoretically indistinguishable if for every positive polynomial p(·) and every
sufficiently large n,
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D(ρx, ρy) <
1
p(n)
. (13)
Proof. For every quantum circuit family {Cn},
Pr[Cn(EG(1n)(x)) = 1]
=
∑
k
pk · Pr[Cn(Ek(x)⊗ σ) = 1]
= Pr[Cn(
∑
k
pkEk(x)⊗ σ) = 1]
= Pr[Cn(ρx ⊗ σ) = 1], (14)
where σ is the density operator of service bits of Cn.
Similarly,
Pr[Cn(EG(1n)(y)) = 1] = Pr[Cn(ρy ⊗ σ) = 1]. (15)
Any quantum circuit family Cn built for distinguishing two density opera-
tors corresponds to a set of positive operator-values measure (POVM) {Em}.
Define pm = Tr(Cn(ρx ⊗ σ)Em), qm = Tr(Cn(ρy ⊗ σ)Em) the probabilities of
measurement outcomes labeled by m. In this case, we have:
∣∣∣Pr[Cn(ρx ⊗ σ) = 1]− Pr[Cn(ρy ⊗ σ) = 1]
∣∣∣
≤ max
{Em}
1
2
∑
m
|Tr[Em(Cn(ρx ⊗ σ)− Cn(ρy ⊗ σ))]
= max
{Em}
D(pm, qm). (16)
The last formula is equal to
D(Cn(ρx ⊗ σ), Cn(ρy ⊗ σ)) ≤ D(ρx ⊗ σ, ρy ⊗ σ) = D(ρx, ρy) <
1
p(n)
. (17)
Hence, according to the Definition 7, the theorem follows. 
For quantum public-key encryption scheme, we also have a theorem:
Theorem 2. For every plaintexts x and y and public-key k, let the density
operators of cipher states
∑
k pkEk(x) and
∑
k pkEk(y) are ρx and ρy, respec-
tively. A quantum private-key encryption scheme is said to be information-
theoretically indistinguishable if for every positive polynomial p(·) and every
sufficiently large n,
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D(ρx, ρy) <
1
p(n)
. (18)
the proof for quantum public-key encryption scheme is similar to the
above.
4. Semantic security for quantum encryption scheme
The semantic security for quantum encryption scheme means that what-
ever can be efficiently computed from the ciphertext can be efficiently com-
puted when given only the length of plaintext. For quantum private-key
encryption scheme it turns out as:
Definition 9. A quantum private-key encryption scheme is semantically se-
cure if for every quantum algorithm A there exist a quantum algorithm A′,
such that for for every probability ensemble {Xn}n∈N, with |Xn| ≤ poly(n),
every quantum bounded functions f, h, positive polynomial p(·), all suffi-
ciently large n:
Pr[A(1n, EG1(1n)(Xn), 1
|Xn|, h(1n, Xn))
= f(1n, Xn)] < Pr[A
′(1n, 1|Xn|, h(1n, Xn))
= f(1n, Xn)] +
1
p(n)
. (19)
where the encryption algorithm E should be a quantum algorithm, and both
algorithms and functions are output 0 or 1.
Note that here the probability function Pr include more parts than that
within classical definitions, besides the probability distribution of G, Xn, A,
A′, here as the quantum algorithms and functions are both output classical
information, the function Pr should include the probability of collapse.
Similarly we can get the definition for quantum public-key encryption
scheme:
Definition 10. A quantum public-key encryption scheme, (G,E,D), is said
to be semantically secure if for every quantum algorithm A there exists a
quantum algorithm A′ such that for every {Xn}n∈N,f(·), h(·)p(·) and n as in
Definition 9,
Pr[A(1n, G1(1
n), EG1(1n)(Xn), 1
|Xn|, h(1n, Xn)) = f(1
n, Xn)]
< Pr[A′(1n, 1|Xn|, h(1n, Xn))
= f(1n, Xn) +
1
p(n)
. (20)
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where the encryption algorithm E should be a quantum algorithm, and both
algorithms and functions are output 0 or 1.
As aforementioned, the semantic security can also be classified by three
different conditions:
1. As defined above, we get the definitions of information-theoretic se-
mantic security.
2. If the inequalities are satisfied while A andA′ are bounded with polynomial-
time, it results the definitions of computational semantic security.
3. If the inequalities are satisfied while A and A′ are bounded with specif-
ical exponential-time, it results the definitions of physical semantic se-
curity, here the size is determined by the protocol.
5. Equivalence of the security definitions
Firstly, we state and prove the following theorem for quantum private-
key encryption scheme with computational security. The similar results hold
for quantum public-key encryption schemes and for quantum private-key
encryption scheme with information-theoretic security.
Theorem 3. A quantum private-key encryption scheme is semantically se-
cure if and only if it is indistinguishable.
Proof.
1. ”indistinguishability” implies ”semantic security”.
Firstly, As the scheme is indistinguishable, for every Cn, p(·), x, n as in
Def.7 and y = 1|x|, we can get the following inequality:
∣∣∣Pr[Cn(EG(1n)(x)) = 1]− Pr[Cn(EG(1n)(1|x|)) = 1]
∣∣∣ <
1
p(n)
, (21)
Then we construct the quantum algorithm A′ as follow: The quan-
tum algorithm A′ performs essentially while replace the input Xn of
algorithm A with 1|Xn|.
To simplify the notations, let hn(x)
.
= h(1n, x), fn(x)
.
= f(1n, x),
An(x)
.
= A(1n, x) and omit 1|Xn| from the inputs given to A, then
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using the construction of A′ we get:
Pr[A(1n, EG1(1n)(Xn), 1
|Xn|, h(1n, Xn)) = f(1
n, Xn)]
= Pr[An(EG1(1n)(Xn), hn(Xn)) = fn(Xn)];
Pr[A′(1n, 1|Xn|, h(1n, Xn)) = f(1
n, Xn)]
= Pr[An(EG1(1n)(1
|Xn|), hn(Xn)) = fn(Xn)]; (22)
For every string xn ∈ {Xn}, the values fn(xn), hn(xn) are fixed, then we
construct a quantum circuit Cn as follow: on input xn, the circuit Cn
invokes An(EG1(1n)(xn), hn(xn)) and outputs 1 while An outputs fn(xn),
otherwise, Cn outputs 0. This circuit is indeed of polynomial size be-
cause fn(xn) and gn(xn) are polynomial length and A is a polynomial
time quantum algorithm.
Thus we can get:
Pr[Cn(EG(1n)(x)) = 1] = Pr[An(EG1(1n)(Xn), hn(Xn)) = fn(Xn)]; (23)
Proof by contradiction, if the scheme is not semantically secure, then
for every A′
Pr[A(1n, EG1(1n)(Xn), 1
|Xn|, h(1n, Xn)) = f(1
n, Xn)]
> Pr[A′(1n, 1|Xn|, h(1n, Xn))
= f(1n, Xn)] +
1
p(n)
, (24)
which is equivalent to that:
Pr[Cn(EG(1n)(x)) = 1]− Pr[Cn(EG(1n)(1
|x|)) = 1] >
1
p(n)
, (25)
this contradicts InEq.(26), so the sufficiency follows. 
2. ”semantic security” implies ”indistinguishability”.
Also proof by contradiction, if the scheme is not indistinguishable, we
can assume that there exists a polynomial p(·) and a polynomial-size
circuit family {Cn}, such that for infinitely many n’s there exist xn, yn ∈
{0, 1}poly(n) so that:
∣∣∣Pr[Cn(EG(1n)(xn)) = 1]− Pr[Cn(EG(1n)(yn)) = 1]
∣∣∣ >
1
p(n)
, (26)
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Then we define Xn is uniformly distributed over {xn, yn}, define
f(1n, Xn) = 1 while Xn = xn and equals 0 while Xn = yn with both
probability 1/2, and define h(1n, Xn) equals the description of the cir-
cuit Cn while it reveals no information on the value of Xn.
Here we present a polynomial-time quantum algorithm A that, it re-
covers Cn = h(1
n, Xn), takes EG(1n)(xn) as input, and outputs what Cn
outputs.
Thus we can get:
Pr[A(1n, EG1(1n)(Xn), 1
|Xn|, h(1n, Xn)) = f(1
n, Xn)]
=
1
2
· Pr[A(1n, EG1(1n)(xn), 1
|xn|, Cn) = 1]
+
1
2
· Pr[A(1n, EG1(1n)(yn), 1
|yn|, Cn) = 0]
>
1
2
+
1
2p(n)
(27)
In contrast, while the input values 1n, 1|Xn| and h(1n, Xn) are indepen-
dent of the random variable f(1n, Xn), A
′ can not output f(1n, Xn)
with success probability above 1/2, so we get:
Pr[A′(1n, 1|Xn|, h(1n, Xn)) = f(1
n, Xn)] ≤
1
2
. (28)
Combining InEqs.(27),(28), we reach a contradiction to the hypothesis
that the scheme is semantically secure. Thus the necessity follows. 
As both sides of the theorem are proved, the theorem is proven. 
6. Conclusions
In this paper we suggest definitions of indistinguishability and sematic
security for quantum encryption schemes with information-theoretic secu-
rity, physical security and commotional security. We show that a necessary
and sufficient condition leads to information-theoretic indistinguishability,
which is useful for proving this security. We proved the equivalence between
the indistinguishability and semantic security with computational security of
quantum encryption schemes, the other equivalence is also hold with similar
proof.
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